CONSTITUTIONALLY-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE SUITS AND THEIR LIKELY NEGATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT

Amy Luri
INTRODUCTION

Environmental justice and [b] rownfields are inextricably linked.'
Environmental injustice has been said to occur when "some individual or group bears disproportionate environmental risks, like
those of hazardous waste dumps, or has unequal access to environmental goods, like clean air, or has less opportunity to participate in
environmental decision-making."2 Abandoned, contaminated commercial and industrial properties, referred to as "brownfields," cover

urban areas populated predominantly with people of color, lowincome individuals, indigenous peoples, and otherwise marginalized
communities.3 The physical conditions of these urban areas, including the presence of brownfields, have been said to contribute to such
problems as "human disease and illness, negative psycho-social im-
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SIGNS OF HOPE, at es-ii (1996) [hereinafter SIGNS OF HOPE], available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/public - dialgue-brownfields- 29
6.pdf. The report is the result of public meetings held on the specific issues surrounding the
revitalization of urban areas with new industry that would provide jobs, eliminate the problems
associated with abandoned buildings, and establish a sustainable community. In 1995, the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council ("NEJAC") recommended to the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") that it hold these public meetings. Thus, in 1995, the NEJAC Waste
and Facility Siting Subcommittee and the EPA co-sponsored a series of public hearings regarding urban revitalization and brownfields. These public dialogues were held in: Atlanta, Georgia;
Boston, Massachusetts; Detroit, Michigan; Oakland, California; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
"They were intended to provide... an opportunity for environmental justice advocates and
residents of impacted communities to systematically provide input regarding... the EPA's
Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative." Id. at es-i.

AUTHENTIC

2 KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE: CREATING EQUALITY, RECLAIMING
DEMOCRACY 3, 3 (2002).
3 See SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 1, at es-ii (describing the typical locations of brownfields).
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pact, economic disincentive, infrastructure decay, and overall community disintegration."4 Environmental justice advocates attempt to
fight these perceived injustices.
Environmental justice began to emerge as a major issue in 1987
when the Commission of Racial Justice of the United Church of
Christ published a report entitled Toxic Wastes and Race in the United
States.5 The report concluded that the single most important indicator of proximity to a hazardous waste site is the race of the majority of
the community. 6 Many environmental justice advocates began to argue that the poor conditions found in urban areas are "due in part to
racism and classism in the siting of environmental risks, the promulgation of environmental laws and regulations, the enforcement of
environmental laws, and the attention given to the cleanup of the
polluted areas. " '
In response to these perceived environmental injustices, advocates
continue to look for legal bases to remedy the situation. One case
stands at the forefront in addressing possible viable constitutionallybased legal arguments in support of environmental justice: South
Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of EnvironmentalProtection." Specifically, the plaintiffs have attempted to use both the pro4

Id.

' UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIALJUSTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES SURROUNDING HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987) (studying the extent to which

minorities are exposed to hazardous waste sites in their communities).
6 Michael B. Gerrard, Discussion, Reflections on EnvironmentalJustice,
65 ALB. L. REV. 357, 358
(2001) (explaining the concept behind the environmental justice movement as the notion that
low income and minority communities should not be exposed to environmental hazards to a
greater extent than other communities). It is important to note that many methodological issues7 have been raised about the study. Id.
Vicki Been, Locally UndesirableLand Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: DisproportionateSiting or
Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384 (1994); e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE:
RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1-6 (1990); Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, 7 NAT'L RES. & ENV'T 23 (1993); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Envi-

ronmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 629-30
(1992); Karl Grossman, Of Toxic Racism and EnvironmentalJustice, E MAG., May-June 1992, at 29,
31.
8 The caption refers to a number of dispositions in the District Court for the District
of New
Jersey as well as one Third Circuit decision. Although cited here in reverse chronological order, the decisions will be referred to numerically in the order in which they were decided: 254
F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J. 2003) ("S. Camden IV), on remand from 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) ("S.
Camden I), rev'g 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001) ("S. Camden IF), modifying 145 F. Supp. 2d
446 (D.N.J. 2001) ("S. Camden r1). The case has not yet gone to trial, and as such, there is no
final disposition.
There has been one other constitutionally based environmental justice action in which
plaintiffs bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a city for violating the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause survived summary judgment. See Miller v. City of Dallas,
No. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2341, at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (noting
that the magnitude and nature of a practice "can alone give rise to an inference of discrimina-
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hibition of section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 and
the exgress right of action for violations of the Equal Protection
Clause found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983" to remedy perceived environmental injustices. Unfortunately, should their constitutionally-based
legal arguments succeed, residents of industrialized, impoverished
urban areas with large minority populations will suffer both economic and environmental harms. Specifically, a fear of liability will
prevent developers from cleaning and redeveloping brownfields in
order to build newer, cleaner facilities.
This Comment will address the merits of the plaintiffs' claims,
which are currently before the District Court for the District of New
Jersey, as well as the likely negative environmental and economic impact should they win. Part I gives a brief discussion of the facts of,
and the history behind, the case. Part II discusses the merits of the
legal arguments made by the plaintiffs in pursuit of environmental
justice, as well as the reasons why the appropriate standard for evaluating such constitutionally-based environmental justice suits should
be the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.12 and Columbus
3
Board of Education v. Penick.1
Part III examines the economic and environmental consequences should the plaintiffs win.

tory intent"). However, shortly after the court denied summary judgment to the defendants,
finding that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the City of Dallas engaged in intentional discrimination, the parties settled for an undisclosed amount of damages. Melissa A.
Hoffer, Closing the Door on PrivateEnforcement of Title V and EPA's DiscriminatoryEffects Regulations:
Strategiesfor EnvironmentalJustice Stakeholders After Sandoval and Gonzaga, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV.
971,980-81 (2004).
9 Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d)
("No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall. .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
1 The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
12 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
IS 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
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I. SOUTH CAMDEN CITIZENS IN ACTION V.
NEWJERSEY DEPARTMENT OFENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. The Case
A group of Camden, New Jersey residents, from a neighborhood
known as Waterfront South, formed an unincorporated community
organization called South Camden Citizens in Action ("SCCIA").
On February 13, 2001, this organization filed suit in the District Court
for the District of New Jersey against the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection ("NJDEP")' 5 for its issuance of air permits
to the St. Lawrence Cement Company ("SLC") to build and operate a
facility in Waterfront South. 6 SLC intervened in the action as a de7
fendant."
Camden, New Jersey, has a population of approximately 87,500
people, of which 87% are minorities.'
In particular, Waterfront
South has 2,132 residents, of which 91% are persons of color.' 9 The
poverty rate in Camden is 39.6%. 20 Camden is the fourth poorest city
in the country, and the second most dangerous.'
Only 4.8% of
Camden residents over the age of twenty-five have graduated from
college. 2
One-third of Camden's nine square miles is comprised of manufacturing and associated land use, and brownfields account for more
than half of all industrial sites in Camden. 5 Waterfront South alone
is home to "the Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority, a sewage treatment plant, the Camden County Resource Recovery facility,
a trash-to-steam plant, the Camden Cogen Power Plant, a cogeneration plant, and two U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") designated Superfund sites., 24 Currently, the EPA is investigating four sites within a half mile of SLC's facility for the possible re-

S. Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
The NewJersey Department of Environmental Protection is responsible for enforcing the
environmental laws and regulations of the State of New Jersey, and, where applicable, federal
law. Id.
16 Id.;
Brief of Intervenor-Appellant St. Lawrence Cement Co., L.L.C. at 3, S.Camden III, 274
F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) (No. 01-2224/01-2296) [hereinafter SLC Brief I].
17 S.Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
18 U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA BROWNFIELDS TITLE VI CASE STUDIES: SUMMARY REPORT
14
15

app. B, at B-1 3 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/ej/ejndx.htm#titlevi.
19 S. Camden 1, 145 F.
Supp. 2d at 451.
20 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 18, app. B, at B-3.
21 Id.
'2 Id.
23 Id.
24 S.Camden I, 145 F. Supp.
2d at 451.
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lease of hazardous substances. 25 Also, NJDEP has identified fifteen
"known" contaminated sites in Waterfront South.26
B. The History Behind the Case
SLC is a cement materials supplier, primarily to the "ready mix"
concrete industry. 7 The SLC facility in Camden grinds "granulated
blast furnace slag ("GBFS"), a sand-like by-product of the steelmaking industry... into [a] ...partial substitute for the use of portland cement in concrete., 28 In order to do so, "[t]he process simply
grinds the material into finer particles and drives off its moisture content," leaving the ground GBFS with "properties similar to ordinary
dirt or other cement materials."'
In 1998, SLC determined that an under-used site in Camden
would be an ideal location for a new GBFS grinding facility ("the Facility") .o Thus, it sought to lease the site from its owner, the South
Jersey Port Corporation ("SJPC").
SLC has cited numerous reasons
for choosing the location. First, the site is a "port location" on the
Delaware River, which allows for removal of any finished product, by
barge, directly from the Facility. 3 Second, the SJPC also owns another port located a few miles away, which allows for the receipt of
incoming shipments of GBFS. 4 Third, the site "is located in an industrial area with a strong existing infrastructure, including ready access to major highways, bridges into Philadelphia and Interstate 95, as
well as secondary roads that have historically been used to service
port operations."35 Fourth, the citizens of Camden can fulfill workforce requirements. 36 And, lastly, SJPC has a history of port operations, and thus, "already understand[s]
the needs of off-loading bulk
7
material and handling bulk cargo.",

On March 8, 1999, SLC signed a lease agreement with SJPC for
use of the Waterfront South site and began making plans for the Facility.m Also in March 1999, SLC commenced the pre-application
25 Id.
26
27

145 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
SLC Brief I, supra note 16, at 6.

2 Id.
30

Id. at 6 n.5.
Id. at 7.

31 Id.

32 Id.
33 Id.
3Id.
3

Id.

Id.
37 Id.
58 Id.
26
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permitting process with the NJDEP to obtain construction and operation permits, including an air permit for the Facility.3 9 Before issuing

the air permit, NJDEP required that SLC conduct air dispersion
modeling, the results of which were then compared to the EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") .° SLC's air dispersion modeling showed that the Facility was well within the NAAQS
and all other applicable air quality criteria and standards identified
by the NJDEP.
In November 1999, once NJDEP had determined
that SLC had submitted an administratively complete permit application and had fulfilled other regulatory requirements, construction on
the Facility began."
However, it was not until October 31, 2000 that the NJDEP issued
SLC's final air permit. In fact, it did so only after reviewing numerous issues raised by the members of the Camden community regarding: "(1) environmental equity/environmental justice; (2) preexisting local environmental issues; (3) SLC's emission limits; (4) the
results of SLC's... air dispersion modeling; (5) truck emission standards and carbon monoxide air quality evaluation results... ; and
(6) protection
of the health and safety of Waterfront South resi43
dents.

Also, throughout 1999 and 2000, SLC involved the community in
the permitting process to avoid future problems, such as lawsuits by
dissatisfied community members. SLC voluntarily solicited participation by the citizens of Camden in the "planning, construction and ultimate operation of the Facility."44 SLC organized a Community Advisory Panel to discuss issues related to the Facility. 45 Additionally, "SLC

voluntarily helped procure independent technical experts selected by
the community... [who] found that the Facility met applicable standards. ' 46

Furthermore, in July 2000, the NJDEP gave public notice of a
scheduled public hearing on SLC's draft air permit.47 More than 120
members of the public attended the hearing and more than thirty
parties commented on the permit. 48 In addition, during the public

comment period, some interested parties provided the NJDEP with

9

Id. at 8.

40

Id. at 8-9.

41

Id. at 9.

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 12. Pamela Lyons, the director of the NJDEP's Office of Equal Opportunity Contract Assistance and Environmental Equity, aided in providing responses to the issues raised. Id.
44 Id. at
9.
45 Id. at 10.
42

43

46

47
48

Id.

Id. at 11.
Id.
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written submissions.4 9 Despite all of the community involvement in
the permitting process, however, the NJDEP and SLC found themselves defendants in a lawsuit.
II. THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS MADE IN PURSUIT
OF ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE BY SCCIA MUST FAIL
At first, SCCIA moved for preliminary injunctive and declaratory
relief pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 5 Environmental justice advocates were optimistic that such a
claim would succeed given that every state environmental
agency receives federal funding and the Title VI implementing regulations adopted by the EPA require a showing not of discriminatory
intent, but merely of discriminatory effect. 5' Thus, a Title VI claim
seemed to be the most promising legal tool for fighting perceived environmental injustices.
However, the United States Supreme Court crushed the hopes of
environmental justice advocates, including SCCIA, when it issued its
decision in Alexander v. Sandoval.52 In Sandoval, the Court held that
"[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI
display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under
section 602. We therefore hold
5
that no such right of action exists." 1
SCCIA, having lost its strongest legal tool for fighting the perceived environmental injustices, advanced an alternative basis to sustain its claim, arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983"4 provided it with a vehicle to remedy a violation of the EPA's Tide VI implementing

49 Id. at 11-12.
50 S. Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450 (D.N.J. 2001). Section 602 permits
federal departments and agencies that extend federal funding, including the EPA, to issue rules and regulations to "effectuate the provisions of section 601." Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I). Pursuant to that authority, the EPA issued a regulation specifically prohibiting adverse impact discrimination. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b), (c) (2004).
Gerrard, supra note 6, at 358. In fact, District Judge Orlofsky agreed, finding that the
plaintiffs could directly enforce the EPA's Title VI implementing regulations through section
601 and, as such, that there was a reasonable likelihood that operation of the Facility would lead
to an adverse, disparate impact on the residents of Waterfront South based on race, color, or
national origin. S. Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
52 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Sandoval was issued only five days afterJudge Orlofsky issued his decision in South Camden I. The case then returned to the district court on a motion to vacate the
previous opinion and order of the court, or, in the alternative, for a stay pending appeal. In
response, the plaintiffs advanced an alternative argument. See S. Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505
(D.NJ. 2001) (considering whether the plaintiffs could bring their Title VI claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
53 532 U.S. at
293.
54 See supra note
11.
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regulations.55 The district court held that the plaintiffs could enforce
the disparate impact regulations promulgated by the EPA using
§ 1983. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed. 6 SCCIA lost yet another promising legal tool for
fighting against environmental injustice.
The plaintiffs, however, did not give up. In its Second Amended
Complaint, SCCIA alleged that the NJDEP, by granting an air permit
to SLC, "has caused a diminution in both the quantity and quality of
the available housing stock in the Waterfront South neighborhood,
which has a discriminatory impact on the Waterfront South residents
on the basis of race, color and national origin" in violation of the Fair
Housing Act, Tite VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 5' The district
court disagreed and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) for "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted."8
The plaintiffs also alleged that SLC created a public nuisance to
the residents of Waterfront South through operation of the Facility
and "through the associated use of diesel trucks[, which] ha[s]
caused dust, soot, vapors.... and fumes to be emitted." 59 The district
5 S. Camden II, 145 F. Supp. at 508.
56 S. Camden III, 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3d Cir. 201). The Third Circuit
stated:

The Supreme Court's primary concern in considering enforceability of federal claims
under section 1983 has been to ensure that Congress intended to create the federal right
being advanced. Accordingly, we hold that a federal regulation alone may not create a
right enforceable through section 1983 not already found in the enforcing statute. Similarly, we reject the argument that enforceable rights may be found in any valid administrative implementation of a statute that in itself creates some enforceable right. Applying these rules here, it is clear that, particularly in light of Sandoval, Congress did not
intend by adoption of Title VI to create a federal right to be free from disparate impact
discrimination and that while the EPA's regulations on the point may be valid, they nevertheless do not create rights enforceable under section 1983. The district court erred as
a matter of law in concluding otherwise and therefore also erred in finding that plaintiffs
are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim.
Id. (citations omitted).
57 S. Camden IV 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 499 (D.N.J. 2003). The Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-19 (2004), prohibits "both direct discrimination and practices with significant discriminatory effects" on the availability of housing. 254 F. Supp. 2d at 499. The relevant provisions of the Fair Housing Act, make it unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b).
SCCIA actually included its Fair Housing Act violation claim in the original complaint, but
only relied on the intentional discrimination and impact claims in moving for a preliminary
injunction. S. Camden , 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 471-72 (D.NJ. 2001). Furthermore, the district
court relied only on the disparate impact claim in granting the injunction. Id. at 472.
S. Camden IV 254 F. Supp. 2d at 493, 508.
59 Id. at 492.
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court dismissed the public nuisance claim pursuant to the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion.6 °
However, two of the plaintiffs' claims, found in their Second
Amended Complaint, survived the motion and have yet to be decided. The first claim alleges that the NJDEP intentionally discriminated against the members of SCCIA, and other African American
and Hispanic residents of Waterfront South, on the basis of race,
color, and national origin in violation of both section 601 of Title VI,6
'
and of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The second claim alleges that SLC has created a private nuisance to
the residents
6 2 of Waterfront South through the operation of its Camden facility.

The plaintiffs have asked the district court to grant them relief in
the form of rescision of the air permit and certificates issued by the
NJDEP to SLC. In addition, the plaintiffs have asked the district
court to enjoin the NJDEP from taking further action that allows operation of the Facility and to order the NJDEP "to develop and adopt
comprehensive protocols for reviewing permit applications that will
prevent the granting of permits that have the effect of discriminating
6s
against persons on the basis of color, race, or national origin.,
Should the plaintiffs succeed in showing such "intentional discrimination," environmental justice advocates will have a new promising legal tool to fight perceived environmental injustices. Yet, such
success will have devastating environmental and economic effects on
the City of Camden and other similarly situated urban areas already
environmentally and economically devastated.64
A. IntentionalDiscriminationin Violation of
Section 601 of Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause
The plaintiffs allege that the NJDEP defendants,
who are the recipients of federal financial assistance and subject to the
requirements of Title VI, intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs
and other African-American and Hispanic residents of Waterfront
[South] and the adjoining communities on the basis of race, color, and

60 Id. at

508.

Id.; see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. The Equal Protection Clause provides
that "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1.
62 S. Camden IV 254 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
61

63

Id. at 492.

See supra text following note 11 ("A fear of liability will prevent developers from cleaning
and redeveloping brownfields in order to build newer, cleaner facilities.").
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national origin in violation of § 601 of Title VI [and the Equal Protection
Clause] .65

The plaintiffs argue specifically that the following thirteen allegations, as set forth in their Second Amended Complaint, demonstrate
"intentional discrimination" on the part of the NJDEP. 6 These allegations are:
(a) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] knew that the
residents of Waterfront South and the surrounding neighborhoods

were predominately African-American and Hispanic.
(b) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] knew that the
siting of the SLC facility in Waterfront South would have an adverse
impact upon these African-American and Hispanic residents.
(c)

The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] [chose] to use
the NAAQS and [the] related environmental standards as the criteria
for determining whether a permit should be issued, knowing that
such a limited analysis could not reveal that the permitting of the
SLC facility would create a discriminatory impact on plaintiffs.

(d) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] refused to conduct a disparate impact analysis because they contended that the operation of this facility would not have any negative impact upon the
Waterfront South community.
(e) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] were fully aware
of the requirements of the Title VI and of their obligations, as recipients of federal assistance, to comply with their assurances to the EPA
that they will meet such requirements. They knew that their use of
the NAAQS and related environmental standards as the sole criteria
was not consistent with the EPA's Guidance for receipients of financial assistance and was in violation of Title VI.
(f)

The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] knew of the region's non-compliance with the EPA's proposed standard for PM-2.5
and that the scientific evidence on which the EPA proposed standard
was based. The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] also
knew that SLC would emit significant levels of PM-2.5.

(g) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] failed to consider the health effects of SLC's PM-2.5 emissions in making its [sic]
determination that there would be no adverse effects from SLC operations, and to inform the public about such health effects.
(h) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] knew of the region's non-compliance with the NAAQS for ozone and that the emissions from diesel trucks and SLC's other emissions would tend to in-

crease the level of non-compliance and cause adverse health effects
on the residents.

S. Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
65

66 254 F. Supp. 2d at 493 n.4.
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(i)

The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] issued the permits to SLC even though they knew of the illegal discriminatory impact it would have upon plaintiffs and other African-American and
Hispanic residents.
(j) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] have engaged in
a statewide pattern and practice of granting permits to polluting facilities to operate in communities where most of the residents are African-American and/or Hispanic to a greater extent than in predominately white communities, resulting in discriminatory impact on
the grounds of race, color, and national origin.
(k) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] have failed to
develop or implement a procedure that ensures there will be no discrimination in their permitting decisions or to provide for meaningful public participation for residents of communities affected by the
permitting decisions.
(1) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell] failed to translate documents which were made available in English into Spanish,
even though they knew or should have known that a significant number of the affected people are Hispanic and have limited English proficiency, so that they require Spanish language materials to be available for meaningful participation in the permit process.
(in) The DEP and Commissioner Shinn's [now Campbell] prior history of
permitting decisions and their issuance of the permit to SLC despite
knowledge of its discriminatory effects demonstrate that defendants
intended to and did discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis of
race, color, and national origin.67
The plaintiffs' allegations should fail once evaluated using the appropriate U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Although no court has decided any Title VI or § 1983 suits involving environmental justice
claims like those in SCCIA v. NDEP,6 the Supreme Court has set
forth the standard for determining whether a facially neutral policy,
such as the one at issue, has been issued in violation of section 601 of
Title VI or the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court has stated that "the reach of Title VI's protection extends no further than the Fourteenth Amendment."
To succeed,
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were the target of purposeful or invidious discrimination.
It is not enough that the law has a
67 Id.
68

See supra note 8; see also N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65 (2d. Cir.

2000) (examining whether, pre-Sandoval, the city's selling or bulldozing of any of the 1100 cityowned parcels, comprising approximately 600 community gardens, would have a disproportionately adverse impact on New York City's African American, Asian American, and Hispanic
residents in violation of the regulations promulgated by the EPA to implement Title VI.).
69United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978)).
70 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (rejecting an application of section 601 beyond
intentional discrimination); see also S. Camden X, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 495 ("In order to state a
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disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority; rather, to be
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, the disproportionate adverse impact must be traced to a discriminatory purpose.71
Thus, environmental justice advocates must satisfy a difficult burden.
A statute, neutral on its face, may not constitutionally be applied
so as to invidiously discriminate on the basis or race, color, or national origin. 7' However, mere knowledge that an act may have a discriminatory effect does not rise to the level of discriminatory intent.7
Rather, proof of discriminatory intent requires a "sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial evidence," including, but not limited to,
whether " [t] he impact of
7 4 the official action ... bears more heavily on
one race than another.

Therefore, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the NJDEP issued
the "facially neutral" air permits "'because of,' not merely 'in spite
of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.' ' 75 To satisfy this
"because of' standard, "disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but
it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination. 76
In fact, when the disproportionate impact is essentially an unavoidable consequence of a legitimate legislative policy, the "inference
simply fails to ripen into proof."77 Thus, allegations of disparate impact alone provide an insufficient basis for relief under either section 601 of Title VI or § 1983.
Yet, as rightly noted by SLC in its Brief in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss, all of the plaintiffs' thirteen allegations boil down to a mere
assertion that the NJDEP defendants "'knew' that the Facility would
have an adverse disparate impact on racial minorities but nonetheless

claim upon which relief can be granted under either § 601 of Tide VI or the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983, a party must allege that he or she was the
target of purposeful, invidious discrimination.").
7. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (upholding a law which
gave
preference to veterans for state civil service positions because it was not intentional, although it
had the effect of discriminating against women); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause ... "); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976) (denying that a test administered to police applicants in the District of Columbia, which black applicants failed at a higher percentage than white applicants, but which was
not designed to discriminate, was unconstitutional).
72 Washington, 426 U.S. at 241 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that
use of a neutral statute to invidiously discriminate is unconstitutional)).
73 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256 (holding that mere knowledge does not create a constitutional
claim, unlike discriminatory intent).
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 242).
75 Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Feeney,
442 U.S. at 279); see also S. Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
76 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
7 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25.
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issued the Air Permit."7 Even assuming the plaintiffs' allegations are
true, the district court should not conclude that they rise to the level
of intentional discrimination.
In fact, to the extent that the plaintiffs even touch upon the
NJDEP defendants' motives for issuing the air permit, they do not allege that race played a role in the decision making, but rather only
that the NJDEP and the Commissioner wrongly relied on the Facility's compliance with the NAAQS and other air emission standards
instead of looking at the adverse effects the permit may have on the
residents of Waterfront South.7 9 However, even if these allegations
are true, at most the defendants acted "in spite of'the adverse effects
the operation of the Facility would have upon an identifiable group,
not "because of' the adverse effects.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.8 ° and Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,8 the Supreme Court
identified the objective factors a court should consider in determining whether a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor, since
disparate impact alone is not enough to demonstrate discriminatory
purpose." These factors place a high burden of proof on environmental justice advocates seeking to show intentional discrimination.
The first factor a court should examine is "[t]he historical background of the decision ...particularly if it reveals a series of official
actions taken for invidious purposes."83 Similarly, "[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged4 decision may also shed
some light on the decisionmaker's purposes.",
As noted by SLC in its brief, the plaintiffs cannot rely on the historical background of the NJDEP's decision to issue a permit to SLC
in order to demonstrate that the NJDEP acted "because of' the adverse effects the permitting would have on the minority residents of
Waterfront South.8 s The historical background of the decision does
not reveal any official action taken for invidious purposes. In fact,

78 Brief in Support of St. Lawrence Cement Co., L.L.C.'s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief at 15, S. Camden IV, 254
F. Supp. 2d 486 (No. 01-702) [hereinafter SLC Brief II].
79 Id. at 18-19.
so 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (requiring proof of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose in
order to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
81 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) (noting that "actions having foreseeable
and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose").
82 429 U.S. at 266; see S. Camden IV 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 496 (D.N.J.
2003).
429 U.S. at 267; see Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (emphasizing Virginia's
long-term practice of racial discrimination, and holding that the closing of public schools, while
giving tuition grants and tax concessions to assist white children in private schools, violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
429 U.S. at 267.
SLC Brief II, supra note 78, at 18-19.
83

84

85
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the plaintiffs themselves acknowledged that the NJDEP engaged in a
"lengthy examination" of the Facility, including its projected air emisto heightened
sions, as well as "subjected [the] permit application
86
public scrutiny" before issuing the air permits.
The plaintiffs argue that the NJDEP has historically "engaged in a
statewide pattern and practice of granting permits to polluting facilities to operate in communities where most of the residents are African-American and/or Hispanic to a greater extent than in predominately white communities .... However, even assuming this is true,
it does not reveal a historical pattern of action taken for invidious
purposes. Rather, it recognizes the harsh reality that many areas
zoned for industrial purposes, which already have an established infrastructure ready to accommodate the needs of many industries, are
located in communities where a majority of the residents are African
American and/or Hispanic.s8 Furthermore, most of these areas became industrialized long before the residents of those communities
became predominantly African American and/or Hispanic. For instance, Camden became an industrialized city in the early part of the
nineteenth century, growing dramatically well into the early part of
the twentieth century.8 9 At the turn of the twentieth century, however, British, German, and Irish immigrants populated the city, and
by 1920, Italian and Eastern European immigrants constituted the
majority of Camden's population.9 Therefore, any environmental
justice advocate seeking to demonstrate that the historical background of the decision demonstrates "intentional discrimination"
faces a difficult task.
The second factor the Supreme Court said a court should examine in order to determine whether there was intentional discrimination is whether there were any " [d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence," as such a factor "might afford evidence that
improper purposes are playing a role."9' The plaintiffs have not alId. at 22.
S. Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 494 n.4(j) (D.N.J. 2003).
88 Camden, New Jersey is situated between two waterways, the Delaware and Cooper Rivers.
This, combined with its proximity to Philadelphia, contributed to the rise of industry in Camden beginning in the early part of the nineteenth century. City of Camden, New Jersey: Industrialization, at http://www.ci.camden.nj.us/history/industrialization.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2004).
89 Id. ("The latter half of the Nineteenth Century was the most significant period in
the developmental history of the City of Camden."). In 1860, the census takers counted eighty manufactories in Camden's nine square miles. Id. Ten years later they counted 125. Id. The success
of railroads built in the nineteenth century linked Camden to Philadelphia, Trenton, New York,
and the Atlantic seashore by the year 1881. Id.
90 City of Camden, NewJersey: Development of Neighborhoods, at http://www.ci.camden
.nj.us/history/neighborhooddevelop.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
91 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
86

87
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leged that the NJDEP made any "departures from the normal procedural sequence" other than to subject the permit to heightened public scrutiny.
The third factor the Court said may help to indicate a discriminatory purpose is whether there were any "[s]ubstantive departures.., particularly if the factors usually considered important by
the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one
reached."9' The plaintiffs allege that the NJDEP made "substantive
departures" from the EPA's guidelines; but the process taken by the
NJDEP is the permitting process "sanctioned by the New Jersey State
Legislature under the New Jersey Air Pollution Control Act," which is
"in full compliance with all administrative procedural requirements,
and approved by the EPA as part of New Jersey's State Implementation Plan. 93
The plaintiffs argue that the NJDEP's willingness to issue permits,
94
despite possible violations of the EPA's proposed PM-2.5 standards,
is proof of a discriminatory intent. These standards, however, are
non-binding standards that the EPA did not issue until fifteen
months into SLC's application review process and that still have not
yet been fully implemented. 95 Thus, the plaintiffs have failed to show
any "substantive departure.
The final factor the Court said should be examined in order to
help determine whether the NJDEP acted with a discriminatory intent is "the foreseeability of the consequences of the state action."96
As mentioned above, the plaintiffs do argue that the consequences
were foreseeable. But, that alone is not enough to satisfy the high
burden of showing intentional discrimination by the NJDEP against
the residents of Waterfront South. Thus, the plaintiffs have done
nothing more than make "vague and conclusory allegations" that do
not amount to intentional discrimination in violation of section 601
of Title VI or the Equal Protection Clause.97 Moreover, in the future,
should other environmental justice advocates seek to rely on the
mere fact that negative consequences may be foreseeable, they will
92

Id.

93 SLC Brief II, supra note 78, at 22.
94 PM-2.5 refers to "particulate matter 2.5 microns in diameter or smaller." S. Camden I, 145

F. Supp. 2d 446, 462 (D.N.J. 2001).
95 SLC Brief II, supranote 78, at
22.
96 S. Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 496 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979)). One should note that Arlington Heights does in fact mention
an additional factor-an "examination of the legislative or administrative history ... especially
where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of
its meetings, or reports." 429 U.S. at 268. However, such a factor is not applicable to the case at
hand. Moreover, the district court in the South Camden case has not included in its analysis this
final Arlington Heights factor. S. Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 496 (D.N.J. 2003).
97 SLC Brief II, supra note 78, at 23.
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most likely be unable to show a violation of section 601 of Title VI or
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Yet, even if the plaintiffs, and/or future environmental justice advocates, are able to establish that a permitting agency harbored a discriminatory intent in issuing a permit to a facility, it would not necessarily require invalidation of the permit.98 Instead, the burden would
then shift to the permitting agency to show that it would have issued
the permit in the absence of a discriminatory animus by showing that
"permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have
produced the monochromatic result."
In the present case, the NJDEP should be able to demonstrate
that it would have issued the permit in the absence of a discriminatory animus by showing that the air pollution criteria applied to the
Facility are the criteria uniformly applicable throughout New Jersey
and the nation. Thus, the permit would have been issued regardless
of racial animus, and therefore, the plaintiffs' arguments of intentional discrimination should fail.
The standard as set forth by the Supreme Court in Arlington
Heights and Penick is the standard that should be applied to the South
Camden case, as well as similar future environmental justice cases.100
In the few previous environmental justice cases that have addressed a
plaintiffs allegations of an Equal Protection violation, the courts have
followed Supreme Court precedent requiring a showing of intentional discrimination.'
In R.LS.E., Inc. v. Robert A. Kay, Jr.,°2 the
plaintiff, R.I.S.E. (Residents Involved in Saving the Environment), a
community organization, argued that supervisors of the King and
Queen County Board of Supervisors had violated the Equal Protec98 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271 n.21 (noting that such proof would
have required the
defendant to establish that "the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible
purpose not been considered").
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 632 (1972)); see also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361 (1970) (shifting the burden to the
jury commissioners to show there had been no discrimination); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S.
584, 587 (1958) (finding that uniform and continuous exclusion of African Americans from
juries cannot be attributed to chance, accident, or insufficient qualification).
10 It is useful to note in understanding the parallel of application of Arlington Heights and
Penick to the South Camden case that both lines of cases deal with land use and regulatory zoning.
101See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice": The DistributionalEffects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U.L. REV. 787, 830 (1993) (explaining that even in environmental justice suits, the Fourteenth Amendment requires a showing that race was a motivating factor in
the decision and that the decisionmaker chose or reaffirmed the decion "because of" not
merely "in spite of" the adverse effect on minorities); Joseph Ursic, Note, Finding a Remedy for
EnvironmentalJustice: Using 42 U S.C. 1983 to Fill in a Title VI Gap, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 497,
502-04 (2002) (describing the few environmental justice cases that have presented equal protection challenges involving the citing of hazardous waste facilities in predominantly minority
neighborhoods).
102 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991),
affd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
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tion Clause by proposing a landfill site in a predominantly African
American community.0
The RLLS.E. court held that the Arlington
Heights test was the appropriate standard for determining whether
there had been a violation. Moreover, the court held that although
there had been three other landfills sited in neighborhoods that were
over ninety-five percent African American, and that " [t] he placement
of landfills in King and Queen Country from 1969 until the present
ha[d] had a disproportionate impact on black residents," there was
no equal protection violation. ' 5
In Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., °6 the Southern District of Texas held that although the plaintiffs had demonstrated that
the siting of a solid waste disposal facility within 1700 feet of a predominantly African American high school was both "unfortunate"
and "insensitive," the plaintiffs did not meet their burden under Arlington Heights requiring a showing "that the decision to gra__nt the
permit was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination.'0 7 The
Bean court went on to state that "[t] his Court is obligated, as well as all
Courts are, to follow the precedent of the United States Supreme
Court . .

.

08

In East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning
& Zoning Commission,' 9 the plaintiffs alleged that the commission's
decision to allow for the creation of a private landfill in a predominantly African American community was motivated in part by improper considerations of race in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."0 The district court for the Middle District of Georgia held
that "[t]o prove a claim of discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause a plaintiff must show not only that the state action
complained of had a disproportionate or disciminatory impact but
also that the defendant acted with the intent to discriminate.""' The
East Bibb court held that to prove the defendant acted with the intent
to discriminate, one must consider the Arlington Heights factors."' In
the previous environmental justice cases that dealt with Equal Protection claims, the courts held that a showing of discriminatory intent is
necessary to succeed, and that to make such a showing, one must use
Id. at 1145-46.
Id. at 1149.
105 Id.
106 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.
Tex. 1979).
107 Id. at 680.
108 Id. (emphasis added).
103
104

"9 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
1o Id. at881.

I Id. at 884 (quoting United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1216 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988) (relying on Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
and E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1987))).
11 Id. at 884.
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the factors set forth in Arlington Heights. Thus the deciding courts in
the S. Camden cases should apply the standard in like fashion.
Although true that "[s]tare decisis is not an 'inexorable command,'
the doctrine is 'of fundamental importance to the rule of
law"' and precedent should not be overruled absent a "'special justification. ""' When it comes to environmental justice, however, it is unclear what "specicial justification" exists to warrant a departure that
does not exist in other contexts involving racial discrimination. Furthermore, because in the previous environmental justice cases the
courts applied the Arlington Heights factors to determine whether
there was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and none of
them identified difficulties in doing so, it furthers the argument that
there is no "special justification" for not affording Arlington Heights its
precedential worth when addressing environmental
justice situations
14
like the one presented by the South Camden case.'
Hence, for the plaintiffs in the South Camden case and/or future
environmental justice advocates to succeed, they must meet a very
high burden, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights
and Penick. Such a high burden makes it likely that environmental
justice advocates will have to continue to search for alternative means
of attacking perceived environmental injustices. Should the district
court decide, however, that SCCIA has successfully demonstrated "intentional discrimination," it will send a signal to environmental justice advocates that the standard set forth by the Court may be less
stringent when applied to environmental justice suits.
B. PrivateNuisance
An evaluation of the plaintiffs' private nuisance claim, using the
proper legal standards, shows that it, as well as similar future claims,
should fail. According to the NewJersey Supreme Court, "[tihe essence of a private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the
use and enjoyment of land.""' 5 The court further explained that
"[t]he question is not simply whether a person is annoyed or disturbed, but whether the annoyance or disturbance arises from an un-

Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556-57 (2002) (citations omitted).
Although the courts in RLSE, Bean, and Bibb did not address the additional factor
set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Penick-that a court should examine the foreseeability of the consequences of the state action- the factor is an important one in the evaluation
of constitutionally based environmental justice suits, especially because it provides the plaintiffs
with an element of proof that is far easier to satisfy than any of the Arlington Heights factors.
15 Sans v. Ramsey Golf& Country Club, Inc., 149 A.2d 599,
605 (N.J. 1959); see also S. Camden
IV 254 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (citing Sans as the basis for state nuisance claims).
11
11
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reasonable use of the neighbor's land or operation of his business.""'
Thus, "reasonableness should be the guiding principle" when
making
7
nuisance."
private
a
of
existence
the
to
as
determination
a
In addition, "[a] defendant is only liable for a nuisance that
'causes significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered by a normal
person in the community."'1 8 "Significant harm" means "harm of
importance, involving more than slight inconvenience or petty annoyance. '
Here, the operation of the Facility cannot lead to an unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of land because the Facility
and the plaintiffs' residences are located in an area zoned for industrial development and which has been heavily industrialized for over
a century. The plaintiffs even acknowledge that the neighborhood
has "many operating industrial facilities, including but not limited to
four scrap metal companies, a petroleum coke transfer station,
chemical companies, machine shops, and food processing companies. '"2 ° Furthermore, Camden has historically been an urban area
zoned for industrial purposes with a great number of industrial facilities present since the beginning of the nineteenth century, long before the plaintiffs moved to Camden.' Thus, the residents of this industrial neighborhood cannot claim that operation of the Facility is
causing "an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
land.",

2

Even if the plaintiffs were able to show that the operation of the
Facility has led to an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land, their attempt to satisfy the "significant harm"
standard should fail. The plaintiffs' attempt to satisfy the standard by
stating that "the synergistic and cumulative effects of all of the contaminants in the area and the poor health of the residents make

n1 Sans, 149 A.2d at 605; see also S. Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (using the Sans language as guidance).
117 SLC Brief II, supra note 78, at 32 (citing Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. v. Medford
Lakes, 449 A.2d 472, 477 (N.J. 1982) (discussing the general NewJersey rule applied in cases of
competing water rights interests)); see also Sans, 149 A.2d at 605-06 (applying a general test of
equity in determining whether an adjacent golf course created a private nuisance).
it S. Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F
(1979)). "The location, character and habits of a particular community are to be taken into
account in determining what is offensive or annoying to a normal individual living in it."
§ 821F cmt. e.
119 § 821F cmt.
c.
120SLC Brief II, supra note 78, at 35.
1
City of Camden, New Jersey: Industrialization (discussing the development of industry in
nineteenth century Camden), at http://www.ci.camden.nj.us/history/industrialization.html
(last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
122 Sans, 149 A.2d at 605.
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123
these residents especially vulnerable to the effects of pollution."
Thus, the plaintiffs are arguing that SLC is a small part of the larger
problem: the polluted, industrialized area of Waterfront South.
Therefore, the plaintiffs have failed to show that the Facility alone, as
opposed to other local industrial entities, has caused them significant
harm because the plaintiffs have failed to allege that the Facility
alone has caused them any problems. In addition, it would be extremely difficult for any environmental justice advocate to show that
one particular facility, that is in compliance with all requirements and
located in an area zoned for industrial development, is the particular
cause of a private nuisance to the neighboring residents.

III. SHOULD THE PLAINTIFFS WIN, THERE WILL BE ECONOMIC
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RESIDENTS OF CAMDEN
AND OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED IMPOVERISHED URBAN AREAS
WITH LARGE MINORITY POPULATIONS

Should the plaintiffs succeed in demonstrating "intentional discrimination" on the part of the NJDEP, there will be significant economic and environmental consequences for the residents of Camden
and the residents of other industrialized poor urban areas with large
minority populations. Specifically, these economic and environmental consequences will be the result of a failure to redevelop
"brownfields" due to a fear of liability, as the standard for what constitutes intentional discrimination may appear to be lower when applied
in environmental justice cases, than the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights12 4 and Penick.12 5 The possibility of a
lower standard makes the chances of successful litigation more likely,
which in turn makes a rise in the number of suits filed more likely.
The fear of liability slows projects, which in turn leads to a chilling ef-

fect.
As noted above, half of all industrial sites in Camden, New Jersey
are brownfields. Section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") defines the term "brownfield site" as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence
or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant."12 6 The EPA has defined brownfields as "abandoned, idled
12 Reply Brief in Support of St. Lawrence Cement Co., L.L.C.'s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 17, S.
Camden IV 254 F. Supp. 2d 486 (No. 01-702).
124 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
12 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
126 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39) (A) (2002). CERCLA is an environmental law establishing "a federal

program [designed] to identify and remediate chemical spills and abandoned hazardous waste
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or underused industrial and commercial sites where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination that can add cost, time or uncertainty to a redevelopment
project."'27 The now-defunct U.S. Office of Technology Assessment
("OTA") defined a brownfield site as a site where redevelopment may
be held up, not only by potential contamination, but also by "poor
location, old or obsolete infrastructure, and other... factors often
associated with neighborhood decline." '28 Brownfields are often associated with "distressed urban areas, particularly central cities and inner suburbs that
once were heavily industrialized, but since have
29
been vacated.",

Brownfields are a serious problem, especially for poor urban areas, home to most brownfield sites.' Brownfields continue to pollute
as long as they are not cleaned. There are an estimated 130,000 to
over 425,000 contaminated commercial and industrial sites around
the country. 3' The estimated cost of the initial clean up of our nation's brownfields is approximately $650 billion. 32 Brownfields also
represent millions of dollars in lost wages and unrealized tax dollars. 3 And, according to the OTA, "It]he presence of brownfields
contributes... to reduced economic development and job creation
in urban areas, particularly in central cities and older suburbs." 134 A
survey of thirty-three cities, all of which are the home of many brownfields, "conservatively estimated" that each city has a cumulative annual loss of approximately $121 million in tax receipts due to a failure to redevelop brownfields. 13 More realistically, however, the cities
estimated an annual loss of $386 million, suggesting that billions of
dollars are lost nationwide each year in local tax receipts as a result of
a failure to restore brownfields.'

sites believed to pose a significant threat to human health, safety and the environment." Todd
S. Davis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 5, 7 (Todd S. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2001).
127 REGION 5 OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
BASIC BROWNFIELDS

FACT SHEET (1996).

128 U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR

CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 1 n.1 (1995).
129Davis, supra note 126, at

5.
130See SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 1, at es-ii
(referring to the connection between brownfields
and poor urban areas).
131 See

U.S.

DEVELOPMENT:

GEN.

ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

REP.

NO.

GAO/RCED-95-172,

COMMUNITY

REUSE OF URBAN INDUSTRIAL SITES 3 (1995) (noting the number of contami-

nated properties as of 1987).
132Davis, supra note 126, at 6.
132

NORTHFAST-MIDWEST INST., COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A RESOURCE

BOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES 2 (1996).
1 U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 128, at 4.
1
136

Davis, supra note 126, at 6.
Id.
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Brownfields are trapped in what has been described as "a vicious
cycle of decline."137 First, "[a] property owner, unwilling or unable to
sell contaminated property, mothballs it, thus undermining the local
tax base."38 Vacant facilities then deteriorate and attract arsonists, illegal dumping, the stripping of parts and materials, and other vandalism.1 39 Then, "[the u]naddressed contamination may spread, further

eroding the property value," which leads to higher cleanup costs and4
a decrease in the economic viability of neighboring properties.' 0
This entire decline leads a potential investor, who would possibly
clean and redevelop a brownfield, to seek development opportunities
elsewhere, especially due to "uncertain costs and legal liabilit[y] .
As a result, brownfield sites become unwanted financial and environmental burdens on the community, which in turn leads to skyrocketing unemployment rates.142 Also, because brownfield communities lose143 property tax receipts, "public services become less
available.,

The vast majority of brownfields are cleaned and redeveloped
through private transactions.'4 Fear and uncertainty regarding liability is the primary reason brownfields are not cleaned or redeveloped.145 Most of the fear held by redevelopers stems from the complexity and ambiguity of CERCLA.146 Thus, redevelopers who might
otherwise invest, shy awa from these brownfield sites because of a
fear of CERCLA liability.
However, this fear of liability extends beyond redevelopers to
lenders as well. One study documented that over forty percent of
commercial mortgage bankers had withdrawn from mortgage deals
on properties that were potentially contaminated. 4 s Of that forty

137 NORTHEAST-MIDWEST INST., supra note 133, at 2.

Davis, supra note 126, at 6.
Id. at 7 (noting the "crisis" caused by brownfields). In the City of Chicago, cleanup of illegal dumping at brownfield sites costs approximately $11.5 million dollars per year. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, app. B, at B-28.
10 Davis, supra note 126,
at 7.
141Id.
I42
Id. (discussing the chain of negative economic consequences resulting from the aban1

139

donment of brownfields).
143Id.; see also Steven Lerner, Brownfieds of Dreams, AMICUSJ., Winter 1996, at 17 (discussing

the problems caused by brownfields, as well as the costs and benefits of redevelopment).
14 Telephone Interview with Alan Waits, Associate Regional Counsel, EPA Region 5 (Jan. 21,
2004) (transcript on file with author). At the time of the interview, Mr. Walts was the acting
Environmental Justice Coordinator for EPA Region 5.

145Davis, supra note 126, at 9.

1 Id. at 7; see 42 U.S.C. cb. 103 (2002).
147Davis, supra note 126, at 7.
148Id. at 11.
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percent, "[eighty-seven] percent ...said that fear of environmental
liabilities had delayed transactions. " 149

If Title VI and Equal Protection claims, identical or similar to
those made by SCCIA, are successful, redevelopers and lenders will
1 50
have yet another form of liability to fear: constitutional liability.
Such a fear of constitutional liability, similar to the fear of CERCLA
liability, will hinder redevelopers from cleaning brownfield sites in
order to build new industrial facilities, which will benefit the community both economically, by providing jobs and greater tax receipts,
and environmentally, by cleaning contaminated sites and replacing
them with newer cleaner facilities. 5' Furthermore, the fear of constitutional liability will be exacerbated
by the fact that intentional inju52
ies are generally not insurable.
In 1999, the EPA Brownfields Title VI Case Studies Summary Report
showed that according to community stakeholders 15s in Camden, New
Jersey; Charlotte, North Carolina; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Lawrence, Massachusetts; and the City of Miami/Miami-Dade
County, Florida, Title VI suits and the fear of environmental justice
complaints had not yet negatively impacted the redevelopment of
brownfield sites.5 4 However, these same stakeholders stated that such
liability "could potentially slow down or block progress in the fu-

Id.
It is important to note that, as in the Camden case, the potential constitutional liability
would most likely be against the environmental authorities who grant permits, not against the
developers themselves. However, the effect is still the same in that the redevelopment process is
slowed and redevelopers may lose their permits.
151 See infra text accompanying notes
153-71.
12 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 132.2 (Eric Mills
Holmes & Mark
S. Rhodes eds., 2d ed. 1996).
153These stakeholders include "[p]ilot contacts; community and environmental justice
groups; community development corporations and other business associations; lenders and developers; environmental groups; and local, State and Federal government contacts." U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 2. Pilot contacts provide accurate information on the
status of brownfields' activities, as well as those players that are active and those that are not.
Community and environmental justice groups provide "input on the level and timeline of
community involvement" and a context for the areas' demographics. Id. Community development corporations and other business associations give "a balanced view of the business and
community aspects of redevelopment and community involvement." Id. Lenders and developers provide information "on the barriers to brownfields redevelopment," and how developers
view community involvement in the development process. Id. Environmental groups offer information on the "activities and influences of 'outside' groups [that] may play a role in complaints filed." Id. at 2-3. Local government contacts are able to provide an "objective history of
[a] brownfields area, [which includes its] past use and redevelopment activities as well as activism in the area." Id. at 3. State government contacts "provide information on permitting and
enforcement issues." Id. And, lastly, the Federal contacts would "provide a non-EPA perspective on the activities and partnerships involved in the Pilot project." Id.
14 Id. at 6-7 (reporting the effects of Title VI
concerns on brownfield pilots, according to
more than fifty interviews in a study published in 1999).
149
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ture." 55 And, according to Christopher J. Daggett, the former Com-

missioner of the NJDEP and former Regional Administrator of Region II of the EPA, anything that slows the process of building hinders investors from investing. 5 6 This is the case because the longer it
takes for investors to realize a return on their investments, the greater
the return must be to offset the losses caused by the money being
"tied up" in the brownfield1 7 Thus, if liability delays a return on an
investment, investors and developers will look to build a facility elsewhere instead of redeveloping brownfields.
Specifically, the stakeholders interviewed for the 1999 EPA report,
including those in Camden, New Jersey, believed that "early and
meaningful community involvement" and "redevelopment that creates a benefit for the local community" are the two most important
factors that have prevented and will continue to prevent Tide VI
complaints.'58 The stakeholders believed that involving the community at the early stages will allow potential problems to be identified
and solved in the beginning, when stakes are low and changes can be
made. 59 And thus, Title VI liability will be avoided. In fact, one such
example cited in the 1999 report came out of Camden, New Jersey.
There, Liberty Concrete held community meetings at which it described the "new, cleaner process" it planned to employ, as well as its
agreement to allow independent on-site monitoring.1w Such community meetings helped prevent a suit against Liberty Concrete.

155Id. at 15.
156

Telephone Interview with ChristopherJ. Daggett, Executive Vice President, International

Risk Group, LLC (Jan. 12, 2004) (transcript on file with author). Mr. Daggett is the former
Commissioner of the NJDEP, the former Regional Administrator of Region 2 of the EPA, and is
currently involved in the business of brownfields redevelopment. He believes that the two main
obstacles to brownfields redevelopment are "time" and "uncertainty." Id.
157 Id.
158 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 13.

It should also be noted that "sophisti-

cated education in environmental justice and understanding of the Title VI Interim Guidance
could potentially slow down or block actions in the future if community involvement and decision-making methods break down, or if a group feels a proposed end use is unacceptable." Id.
at 8. One interviewee observed: "When [community] groups don't feel like they have gotten
their fair share of the benefits, one way to remedy that is to stir up community activism about
the environmental contamination of the site." Id.
159 Id. (referring to the beliefs of stakeholders involved in the Camden
and Chicago study
Pilots). Communities that have hosted heavy industry for a long time will be skeptical of any
new facility if in the past that community has been "treated like a dumping ground for undesirable land use." Telephone Interview with Alan Waits, supra note 144. As such, a new facility
should approach the community, understanding its skepticism, and explain to the community
how this facility will be an improvement. Id.
160 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 12 (describing Pilot
results).
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However, similar measures taken by SLC failed to lead to an avoidance of litigation.16
Furthermore, the stakeholders interviewed for the 1999 EPA report stated that job creation is a large part of "community satisfaction," which leads to an avoidance of Title VI and environmental justice claims. 62 In fact, in Camden, with regard to the Liberty Concrete
facility, job creation for local Camden residents "played a key role in
turning community opposition [in] to approval.' 6 However, the SLC
facility had fifteen employees at the actual facility, and created work
for "hundreds of SJPC employees, including computer operators,
longshoremen, truck drivers, and machine operators."'
Also,
"[m]ore than half of the jobs at the Facility are filled by Camden
residents, including residents of the Waterfront South community.165
Yet, job creation by SLC did not deter Title VI litigation.
SLC benefited the community in other ways as well. In 1999, SLC
generated $526,000 in revenue per week. 66 In addition, the Facility's
emissions satisfy all of the EPA and NJDEP requirements. 167 Thus, the
Facility does not harm nearby residents' health and yet, sixteen Waterfront South residents filed a Title VI suit.
Some stakeholders in the EPA report believed that another important component in reducing the likelihood of Title VI suits
against brownfield redevelopers is that brownfields tend to be "abandoned, polluted or otherwise blighted.' ' 68 However, the location of
the SLC Facility is a former industrial site that was underused, although not technically a brownfield. And yet, the plaintiffs still sued
under Title VI.
Thus, all of the EPA findings regarding factors that reduce the
likelihood of Title VI liability against brownfield redevelopers failed
to deter litigation in the South Camden case. And, in fact, such Title
169
VI litigation can create a "volatile and distrustful atmosphere."
Such a "volatile and distrustful atmosphere" will keep investors and
161Alan

Walts believes that SLC should have involved the community before beginning the

permitting process. Telephone Interview with Alan Wats, supra note 144. Such early involvement may have helped avoid the current litigation.
162 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note
18, at 8.
163 Id.
1 SLC Brief I, supra note 16,
at 14.
163 Id.

l6 Id. at 13. One should note that SLC does not in fact pay property taxes to the City of
Camden because it is located on state-owned land. Instead, the SJPC, its landlord, uses rent
collected from SLC and other tenants to make payments, in lieu of taxes, to the city and county
governments. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12:11A-20 (West 2000) (providing for New Jersey tax exemptions applicable to SJPC).
167SLC Brief I, supra note 16,
at 13.
18 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18,
at 13.
169 Id. at 15.
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redevelopers from cleaning and redeveloping brownfield sites, thus
actually hurting those people who choose to sue under Title VI or 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
And yet, the City of Camden and other urban areas similarly situated are in desperate need of newer, cleaner industries, such as SLC,
cleaning and redeveloping brownfield sites. 1 70 Camden and urban
areas similarly situated are in desperate need of jobs suitable for a
population lacking higher education."' Camden and urban areas
similarly situated are in desperate need of developers to clean brownfields that contaminate on a daily basis and lose millions of dollars in
tax receipts each year. By filing Title VI and Fourteenth Amendment
suits against those industries willing to come into such urban areas,
develop newer, cleaner facilities, provide jobs to an unemployed uneducated population, and provide tax receipts to a city in desperate
need of money to fight crime and improve schools, the citizens of
Camden are hurting themselves, and other urban areas similarly situated, both environmentally and economically.
CONCLUSION

Environmental justice advocates are searching for legal bases to
attack perceived environmental injustices. SCCIA is one of the first
environmental justice advocacy groups to advance claims of intentional discrimination in violation of section 601 of Title VI and the
Equal Protection Clause, and this will likely be the first such case to
go to trial. However, should the district court find SCCIA's arguments persuasive, it will send a signal to environmental justice advocates that the legal standard for determining intentional discrimination, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.7 2 and Columbus Board of Education v. Penick173 may in fact be less stringent when applied to environmental justice cases. Such a signal will most likely lead to an increase
in similar litigation.
However, environmental justice advocates, in an attempt to improve the living conditions found in many poor urban areas with
large minority populations, will be harming the residents of these areas both economically and environmentally. Redevelopers and lenders, due to a fear of liability, will seek development opportunities
elsewhere instead of cleaning and redeveloping brownfields. Such a
failure to redevelop brownfields will have a devastating effect on
170

See supraPart L.A and accompanying text.

171

See id.

172

429 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1977).
443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979).

173
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communities already economically and environmentally devastated.
Therefore, SCCIA, in its attempt to help, will in fact be causing
greater harm.

